Abstract
Introduction 8
Driven by concerns about public sector expenditure and private sector competitiveness, 9 many commentators have long been critical of the role that regulation plays in modern 10 economies. Gunningham and Grobasky (1999) encapsulate these criticisms suggesting that 11 regulations 'are not effective in delivering their purported goals; or efficient in doing so at 12 least cost; nor do they perform well in terms of other criteria such as equity, administrative 13 viability or political acceptability'. Regulation has therefore been seen to perform badly environmental risk assessments to inform its decision making and, by virtue of its generalised from failure, and they exhibit resilience (robustness to shock) and agility (adaptive 8 management and forward-looking) in response to an evolving business climate. Specifically, 9 they balance business risk and opportunity in a mature fashion that ensures exposures are 10 minimised and strategic competitive advantage is secured. Organisations competent in risk 11 management recognise this maturity of capability is not secured solely through having risk 12 frameworks, risk assessment manuals, audit trails, risk champions and risk registers in place. activities which are most damaging to the environment" (para 95);
10
(vi)the quality and impact of inspections seems to depend on the competence and 11 confidence of individual inspectors -some inexperienced staff appear to lack the 12 confidence to exercise balanced risk-based judgements;
13
Establishing causality in this sense (iv, above) is not easily achieved given the confounding 14 factors influencing environmental change and the multiple actors with this common interest. Alongside tools to integrate evidence, effective environmental decision making needs to 10 face up squarely to key value tradeoffs. Value trade-offs are ubiquitous in regulation.
11
Examples include the tradeoffs between efficacy, efficiency and equity, or public good and Finally, as to the application of different regulatory styles, the adoption of a risk-based 7 approach has enabled the Agency to engage with firms in a more responsive way that targets 8 scarce regulatory resources on the higher risks and the worse performers. Although it could 9 be argued that regulators have been using their discretionary powers to do this for many 10 years, OPRA has given the Agency a more robust way of generating evidence on risk that can 18 There is, therefore, an accumulation of experience in the design and application of risk 19 based regulation in the Environment Agency and an ongoing programme of policy-oriented 20 research that supports the Agency's initiatives in this field (Table 1) . Although the outcomes 21 of risk-based approaches have yet to be subjected to rigorous evaluation, there is a general 22 belief that risk based approaches do lead to better regulatory outcomes. When considered against the standard criteria for policy evaluation, it is assumed that risk 14 based approaches lead to more efficient regulation, both for the public sector as scarce 15 regulatory resources can be applied in a more targeted way and for the private sector as addressed. Finally, the Agency will be challenged more and more to ensure that it has 5 resources that can be rapidly redeployed, and the agility to switch between regulatory styles 6 in response to changing levels of risk. By building its capacities to act in these ways, the 7 Agency would be able to respond to the competing pressures that it commonly encounters in 8 a well informed and balanced way. We adopt preventative risk management because we seek to avoid the unwarranted 
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